It has long been one of the most fundamental problems of philosophy, and it is n
ow, John Searle writes, "the most important problem in the biological sciences":
What is consciousness? Is my inner awareness of myself something separate from
my body?
In what began as a series of essays in The New York Review of Books,
John Searle evaluates the positions on consciousness of such well-known scienti
sts and philosophers as Francis Crick, Gerald Edelman, Roger Penrose, Daniel Den
nett, David Chalmers, and Israel Rosenfield. He challenges claims that the mind
works like a computer, and that brain functions can be reproduced by computer pr
ograms. With a sharp eye for confusion and contradiction, he points out which av
enues of current research are most likely to come up with a biological examinati
on of how conscious states are caused by the brain.
